A graph-theoretic account of fibring of logics is developed, capitalizing on the interleaving characteristics of fibring at the linguistic, semantic and proof levels. Fibring of two signatures is seen as an m-graph where the nodes and the m-edges include the sorts and the constructors of the signatures at hand. Fibring of two models is an m-graph where the nodes and the m-edges are the values and the operations in the models, respectively. Fibring of two deductive systems is an m-graph whose nodes are language expressions and the m-edges represent the inference rules of the two original systems. The sobriety of the approach is confirmed by proving that all the fibring notions are universal constructions. This graph-theoretic view is general enough to accommodate very different fibrings of propositional based logics encompassing logics with non-deterministic semantics, logics with an algebraic semantics, logics with partial semantics, and substructural logics, among others. Soundness and weak completeness are proved to be preserved under very general conditions. Strong completeness is also shown to be preserved under tighter conditions. In this setting, the collapsing problem appearing in several combinations of logic systems can be avoided.
Introduction
The activity of combining logics offers an important mechanism for modularity, which is an essential ingredient in many applications where logic plays a role. The significance of the combination can be accessed by the preservation of properties that the original logics may have. For instance, it is important to know whether the logic resulting from the combination of complete logics is still complete. Proving preservation results constitute a theoretical challenge and, in many cases, they are obtained only by imposing conditions on the original logics. It is interesting to observe that combination mechanisms start to play an essential role in contemporary applications, like argumentation theory, spatial and temporal reasoning and information security [14, 6, 15] . In some of these topics, the logical context has to be set-up appropriately. It is also worthwhile to refer that several combination mechanisms have been developed in the context of modal logic. Examples are fusion [9] and product [11, 12] . Interestingly, even in the specific case of fusion, preservation results are not so easy to prove as can be seen in [9] .
Fibring is a very general mechanism for combining logics that was proposed in [8] . At the language level fibring is an interleaving in the sense that the constructors of the two logics can be interleaved in the language expressions. The same applies to deduction. In a fibring deduction, we can interleave the application of inference rules of the original logics [19, 4] . When developing techniques for fibring one of the main objectives is not imposing too much requirements on the logics being considered. For instance, it would be very interesting to be able to fiber modal logic with a paraconsistent logic getting a new logic suitable for paraconsistent modal reasoning.
A starting point for defining fibring is to set-up the notion of logic system [1] . That is, it has to be specified, in a general way, what is a signature, an interpretation structure and a deductive system, so that a large class of logics can be expressed in this context. Herein, we follow [20] , where signatures, interpretation structures and deductive systems are defined based on the concept of multi-graph (m-graph). This graph-theoretic approach goes very well with the interleaving aspects of fibring and offers a very general, intuitive and uniform way of looking into fibring of logic systems and its components.
An interesting aspect of graph-theoretic fibring is that, semantically, it is explicitly defined for each pair of interpretation structures. That is, each interpretation structure in the fibring results from a clear and understandable construction applied to an interpretation structure of each component. This counts as a positive aspect per se, but also since it makes possible to have in the fibring a representative of all the models of the original logics (this feature was not present for instance in [23] ). It is also worthwhile to mention that fibring is seen as the same universal construction at all levels: at the signature level, at the interpretation structure level and at the deduction level. This means that the logic system resulting from fibring is somehow minimal among the universe of logic systems considered.
Preservation of soundness and weak completeness are proved herein under very general conditions, in contrast with strong completeness that is shown to be preserved but under tighter conditions. These preservation results allow us to conclude that the graph-theoretic semantics we propose for fibring goes hand in hand with the usual fibred deduction. It is worthwhile to mention that, to our knowledge, other approaches to fibring were not successful in proving preservation of weak completeness.
The collapsing problem appearing in several combinations of logic systems can be avoided in this graph-theoretic approach to fibring. Namely, the well known collapse when combining classical propositional logic with intuitionistic propositional logics does not appear [7, 21, 3] . This happens since in our setting the fibred semantics is in a sense an exhaustive interleaving of the semantics of the components, and so the characteristics of the semantics of the components are present in the fibring.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the graph-theoretic fibring of signatures is defined. Section 3 is dedicated to fibring of interpretation structures, and Section 4 concentrates on fibring of deductive systems. These sections start with a motivating example illustrating the main notions to be introduced in the section. Fibring is then defined and illustrated. Afterwards a universal perspective of fibring is given, showing that the constructions are minimal. Finally, the motivating example is revisited on the light of the notions introduced. In Section 5, fibring of logic systems is defined by putting together signatures, interpretation systems and deductive systems. In Section 6, we discuss preservation of soundness. Finally, in Section 7, we investigate preservation of both weak and strong completeness. Throughout the paper we use the fibring of classical and intuitionist logics as the running example. We assume a very moderate knowledge of category theory (the interested reader can consult [16] ).
Fibring signatures
The motivation is that a formula over the signature resulting from the fibring of two signatures is in some sense a path resulting from the interleaving of the constructors in both signatures. For instance, the path ¬ i ⊃ c q i , q c in Figure 1 corresponds to the formula ¬ i (q i ⊃ c q c ) over the signature resulting Figure 1 : Formula ¬ i (q i ⊃ c q c ) as a path.
from the fibring of the signature for classical propositional logic including the binary constructor ⊃ c and the propositional symbol q c , with the signature for intuitionistic propositional logic including the unary constructor ¬ i and the propositional symbol q i .
Putting signatures together
By a multi-graph (in short a m-graph) we mean a tuple
where V is a set (of vertexes or nodes), E is a set (of m-edges), and src : E → V + and trg : E → V are maps. A language signature or, simply, a signature is a tuple Σ = (G, π, ♦) where G is a m-graph, and π and ♦ are in V . Nodes in a signature play the role of language sorts. Node π is the propositions sort (the sort of schema formulas), and node ♦ is the concrete sort, used as the source sort of propositional symbols. The m-edges play the role of constructors for building expressions of the available sorts.
Example 2.1 Let Π be a set of propositional symbols. The classical propositional signature Σ Π is a m-graph G with sorts π and ♦ and the following m-edges:
• q : ♦ → π for each q in Π;
• ¬ : π → π;
• ⊃ : ππ → π.
The m-edges ¬ and ⊃ represent the connectives negation and implication, respectively. The m-edge q represents a propositional symbol q. ∇
We now describe the signature used for intuitionistic propositional logic. The signature resulting from the fibring of two signatures can now be defined. We start by assuming that both m-graphs underlying each signature have the same nodes. That is, they share the same sorts. The fibring of signatures Σ 1 and Σ 2 with the same set V of nodes is the triple
where • E is the disjoint union of E 1 and E 2 with injections i e 1 : E 1 → E and i e 2 : E 2 → E, respectively;
• src • i e 1 = src 1 and src • i e 2 = src 2 , and similarly for trg.
of the signature Σ Π , described in Example 2.1, with the signature Σ ∧,∨ Π , described in Example 2.2, is the signature ((V, E, src, trg), π, ♦) defined as follows
. . . • E(♦, π) = Π c ∪ Π i where Π c and Π i are disjoint copies of Π;
• i e c (¬) = ¬ c , i e c (⊃) = ⊃ c , and i e c (q) = q c for each q ∈ Π;
including the classical and the intuitionistic constructors. So, it is possible to consider in its context more expressible formulas than over each component signature. For a diagrammatic description of this example see Figure 2 (where, for the sake of simplicity, only negation connectives as well as one propositional symbol for each component are considered). An m-graph morphism h : G 1 → G 2 is a pair of maps
A signature morphism is an m-graph morphism respecting the pointed sorts. That is, a signature morphism from signature Σ 1 to signature Σ 2 both with the same set V of sorts,
is a m-graph morphism h :
Example 2.4 The signature morphisms for the Example 2.3,
are defined as follows:
• i c is such that i e c is defined in Example 2.3 and i v c is the identity on V ;
• i i is such that i e i is defined in Example 2.3 and i v i is the identity on V . ∇ It remains to discuss the case of fibring of signatures where the set of sorts is not the same. The solution in this case is to enrich both signatures with the appropriate sorts so that after the enrichment they are equal. For instance, assume that Σ 1 and Σ 2 are signature with the sets of sorts V 1 and V 2 , respectively. Then we consider enriched signatures Σ + 1 and Σ
The fibring of Σ 1 and Σ 2 is then defined as Σ
Universal construction
The fibring of signatures is a minimal construction in the sense that it contains nothing but information on the components. This fact can be stated by proving a universal property. We denote by Sig the category of signatures and their morphisms, and by Sig V the subcategory of Sig whose objects are signatures with sort set V and whose morphisms h are such that h v = id V . In Figure 3 , we describe the main ingredients for showing that the fibring is a coproduct: (1) existence of morphisms i 1 and i 2 ; (2) universal property: given any morphisms h 1 : Σ 1 → Σ and h 2 : Σ 2 → Σ, there is a unique morphism h :
Proposition 2.5 Category Sig V has binary coproducts (and so all non-empty finite coproducts).
Proof: Let Σ 1 and Σ 2 be signatures with sort set V . Their coproduct is the triple
where Σ 1 Σ 2 is the fibring of signatures Σ 1 and Σ 2 and i j = (id V , i e j ) for j = 1, 2. (1) It is straightforward to check that i 1 are i 2 are signature morphisms; (2) Assume that h 1 : Σ 1 → Σ and h 2 : Σ 2 → Σ are signature morphisms. Define h = (id V , h e ) as follows: h e (i e 1 (e 1 )) = h e 1 (e 1 ) and h e (i e 2 (e 2 )) = h e 2 (e 2 ). It is easy to see that h is a signature morphism, and moreover, that it is the unique morphism that makes the diagrams to commute, QED
Finally, we present fibring as an operator on Sig. Let Σ 1 and Σ 2 be signatures in Sig not necessarily with the same set of sorts. The first step when defining fibring is to enrich the given signatures so that they have the same set of sorts. To this end, we introduce a Set
where
then, the fibring Fib Sig of signatures is defined as a map from |Sig| 2 to |Sig| such that
Interleaving of expressions
It is more convenient to work with formulas as morphisms, instead of as paths, in order to capitalize on the additional structure of categories. The formula depicted in Figure 1 as a path, can be seen as the morphism ¬ i • ⊃ c • q i , q c presented in Figure 4 . In that diagram, ππ is a sequence of sorts that corre-
sponds to the object of the product of π by π. That is, the product of π by π is the triple
2 ) where p ππ 1 : ππ → π and p ππ 2 : ππ → π are projections. The underlying category, G + , (for more details see [20] ), has as objects sequences of sorts in G and as morphisms, besides the ones related to products, tuples and projections, the m-edges and compositions. In this category, for instance, the implication ⊃ c is a morphism from the object ππ (of the product of π and π) to the object π. Working in the scope of a category is also very important namely for schema formulas, which are at the heart of the fibring. For instance, the formula ¬ i (ξ ⊃ c q c ) containing the schema variable ξ (which can be instantiated by any other formula) corresponds to the morphism Figure 5 .
Observe that the schema variable corresponds to the projection p π♦ 1 . The formula ¬ i (q i ⊃ c q c ) can be seen as an instantiation of formula ¬ i (ξ ⊃ c q c ) by q i , id ♦ as can be seen in Figure 6 . Observe that ( 
Fibring interpretation structures
Consider the formula in Figure 1 . Intuitively speaking, a denotation for that formula is based on a denotation path as the one in Figure 7 . The nodes should be truth-values and the edges are operations in some interpretation structure, say I, for the signature resulting from the fibring of the signature of propositional logic and the signature of intuitionistic logic. It is clear that the operations denoting q c and to ⊃ c should be operations that evaluate the constructors q, ⊃ of the propositional signature in some interpretation structure, say I c . Moreover, the operations corresponding to q i and ¬ i should be operations that evaluate the constructors q and ⊃ of the intuitionistic signature in some interpretation structure, say I i . Thus, operations from I c and I i should be interleaved in order to get the denotation of a formula over the signature resulting from the fibring of the signatures for classical and intuitionistic logic. The only question is related to the nodes of I. Precisely because of the interleaving of operations the nodes should contain information about truth values from both I c and I i .
. . . Thus, in a nutshell and omitting the details, an interpretation structure I for the fibring of signatures Σ 1 and Σ 2 can be obtained from interpretation structures I 1 for Σ 1 and I 2 for Σ 2 in the following way. A truth value in I is a pair (v 1 , v 2 ) where v 1 is a truth value in I 1 and v 2 is a truth value in I 2 either both designated or both non-designated. An operation o :
should be in I providing that a corresponding operation o : v 1n . . . v 1n → v 1 is in I 1 , and similarly for operations in I 2 .
Putting interpretation structures together
As motivated above, an interpretation structure is an m-graph where the nodes correspond to truth values and m-edges to operations on values. Another key ingredient is that each value should be assigned to a sort and each operation to a constructor in the signature. That is, interpretation structures and signatures should be related by morphisms.
So, an interpretation structure I over a signature (G, π, ♦) is a triple
where G is an m-graph, α :
is a non-empty set and ∈ (α v ) −1 (♦).
Observe that V is partitioned by α: we denote by V v the domain (α v ) −1 (v) of values for each v in V . The elements of V π are the truth values and the elements of V ♦ are the concrete values. We assume that there is at least a concrete value.
An interpretation structure is a pair
where Σ is a signature and I is an interpretation structure over Σ. We now present interpretation structures for classical propositional logic and intuitionistic propositional logic.
Example 3.1 Let v : {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 } → {0, 1} be a classical valuation such that v(q 1 ) = 1 and v(q 2 ) = v(q 3 ) = 0. The interpretation structure I c = (G , α, D, ) over signature Σ Π introduced in Example 2.1, where Π = {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 }, corresponding to v, is defined as follows:
1 Using module 2 arithmetical operations within V .
src and trg are such that:
• α : G → G is such that:
• D = {1}. ∇ Example 3.2 Let (W, R, v) be the intuitionistic Kripke structure where
and v(q 3 ) = ∅, for Π = {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 }. By simplicity we will denote by u 2 and u 1 u 2 the sets {u 2 } and {u 1 , u 2 } respectively. The interpretation structure I i = (G , α, D, ) over the signature Σ ∧,∨ Π introduced in Example 2.2, corresponding to the Kripke structure is defined as follows:
• G = (V , E , src , trg ) is such that:
The fibring of interpretation structures (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ), with the same set V of sorts, denoted by (
is the interpretation structure (Σ, I) where
• Σ is the object of the coproduct in Sig V of Σ 1 and Σ 2 with injections i 1 and i 2 ;
-V is such that:
is, for each s and t in V + , the object of the coproduct in Set of E 1 ((s ) 1 , (t ) 1 ) and E 2 ((s ) 2 , (t ) 2 ) with injections (τ 1 ) e s t and (τ 2 ) e s t , respectively; -src ((τ j ) e s t (e j )) = s and trg ((τ j ) e s t (e j )) = t for j = 1, 2; -α is such that
Observe that the truth values in the fibring are either pairs of distinguished elements or pairs of non distinguished elements.
For the sake of illustration we now describe the interpretation structure resulting from the fibring of the interpretation structure for classical logic, introduced in Example 3.1, with the interpretation structure for intuitionistic logic, introduced in Example 3.2. is as follows:
g g y y y y y Figure 8 : Fibring of interpretation structures for classical and intuitionistic logics (partial representation).
• Σ = ((V, E, src, trg), π, ♦) where:
-all the other components are empty;
-similarly for the implications, disjunction, conjunction and the remaining propositional symbols;
A graphical description of part of the interpretation structure (Σ, I c+i ) (without the implications, disjunction, conjunction and with only a classical and a intuitionistic propositional symbol) can be seen in Figure 8 . A m-graph transformation τ :
So, an interpretation structure morphism between (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ), is a pair
where h : Σ 1 → Σ 2 is a signature morphism and τ : G 2 → G 1 is a m-graph transformation such that:
As expected the m-graph transformation is contravariant with the signature morphism. Moreover, the truth value map τ v is contravariant with the signature morphism. Finally, note that each operation in G 1 can be mapped to several operations in G 2 , and note that the third condition in the definition of interpretation structure morphism is equivalent to saying that if
We now briefly describe the interpretation structure morphisms (i c , τ c ) : 
where the other cases are omitted since they are defined similarly. ∇
Universal construction
The objective now is to prove that the fibring of interpretation structures is a minimal construction by showing that it satisfies a universal property. We denote by Int the category of interpretation structures and their morphisms, and by Int V the subcategory of Int composed by all interpretation structures with sort set V and morphisms (h, τ ) :
Moreover, given a sequence s of pairs, we denote by (s) j the sequence of all j-components of the pairs in s, for j = 1, 2.
Lemma 3.5 Given interpretation structures (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) with the same set of sorts, the pair (i j , τ j ) such that
• i j is the injection from Σ j to the coproduct in Sig V of Σ 1 with Σ 2 ;
is an interpretation system morphism from (Σ j , I j ) to (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ), for j = 1, 2.
Proof: It is straightforward to show that τ 1 and τ 2 are m-graph transformations. Note that i 1 and i 2 are signature morphisms by definition. Furthermore, the tuple (i j , τ j ) is an interpretation structure morphism for j = 1, 2 since
) by definition of α v using also the fact that i v j is the identity;
QED Proposition 3.6 Category Int V has binary coproducts.
Proof: Let (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) be interpretation structures with sort set V . Their coproduct is
2 ) is the fibring of interpretation structures (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ), and (i j , τ j ) for j = 1, 2 are as in Lemma 3.5.
It is now shown the universal property of the coproduct. Let (Σ 3 , I 3 ) be a interpretation structure in Int V and (
3 ) interpretation structure morphisms. Consider the tuple (g, σ) such that:
where g e is the unique morphism in Set such that g e 1 = g e •i e 1 and g e 2 = g e • i e 2 ;
for every
is an interpretation structure morphism from (Σ, I) to (Σ 3 , I 3 ).
) (due to the fact that σ j is a m-graph transformation), the thesis follows.
(e) g e (α e (e )) = α e 3 (σ e
, by definition of σ e , which is equal to g e j (α e j (e j )) since g j , σ j is a m-graph transformation. On the other hand, by definition of g e , g e j (α e j (e j )) = g e (i e j (α e j (e j ))). Finally, the thesis follows, since
The first equality follows directly since all the maps are identities on V . The second equality follows by the universal property of the coproduct.
3. Uniqueness of (g, σ). Assume that there is a m-graph transformation (ĝ,σ) such that (ĝ,σ)
(a)ĝ v = g v since both are the identity on V .
(b)ĝ e = g e . This follows from the universal property.
In order to be able to define fibring for any pair of interpretation structures, and not only for structures with the same set of sorts, we define a Set ♦ indexed map · (V 1 ,π 1 ,♦ 1 ) that enriches each interpretation structure with the sorts only in the other structure, in such a way that satisfaction is maintained:
) where:
+ and trg : E 2 → V coincide with src 2 and trg 2 ;
Proposition 3.7 The interpretation structure (Σ 2 , I 2 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) (V 1 ,π 1 ,♦ 1 ) satisfy the same formulas.
We omit the proof of the proposition above since it follows straightforwardly. So, the fibring Fib Int of interpretation structures is defined as a map from |Int| 2 to |Int| such that:
Interleaving of denotations
Consider the interpretation structure (Σ, I c+i ) in Example 3.3 depicted in Figure 8 resulting from the fibring of the interpretation structure (Σ Π , I c ) for classical logic and of the interpretation structure (Σ
I c+i of the path ¬ i ⊃ c q i , q c corresponding to the formula ¬ i (q i ⊃ c q c ) should be based on the denotation of q c and of q i and on the operations assigned to the connectives ¬ i and ⊃ c . In general, for evaluating ew 1 over I, we start by evaluating w 1 and getting a set of values. Then, for each value s we pick up all the m-edges in G with source s and which are mapped into e. Finally, the envisaged denotation is obtained by taking the collection of targets of such edges. In the case at hand, starting by the denotation of q c ,
Observe that there are two operations, q c 1 : → (0, u 2 ) and q c 2 : → (0, ∅), denoting q c in the interpretation structure I c+i , that is, operations that are assigned by α e to q c . So the denotation of q c is the set of truth values corresponding to the target of those operations. Similarly for the denotation of q i :
I c+i is the concatenation of the denotation of each formula in the tuple.
[ 
The denotation of a concrete formula corresponding to the concrete path w : ♦ → t over G † at I, represented by
I is a concatenation of basic sets contained in V + t , inductively defined on the complexity of the path w as follows:
I is { };
where a subset S of V + v 1 ...vn is a concatenation of basic sets whenever there exist
Consider now the denotation of a schema formula. In this case the denotation of the schema variables should be given by an assignment, which must be also a component in the denotation process. More precisely, an assignment ρ for an interpretation structure I over a signature Σ is a family
I for some concrete path w s : ♦ → s.
The denotation of a formula corresponding to the path w : s → t over G † at I and ρ, denoted by
Iρ is inductively defined on the complexity of the path w similarly to the denotation of a concrete path with the exception that
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfied by I and ρ, written as
Iρ is non-empty and is contained in D. Moreover, we say I satisfies ϕ, written as I ϕ whenever I, ρ ϕ for every assignment ρ over I. Satisfaction is extended to sets of schema formulas as expected: I, ρ Γ if I, ρ γ for each γ ∈ Γ, and similarly for sequences of schema formulas: I, ρ ϕ 1 . . . ϕ n if I, ρ ϕ i for i = 1, . . . , n.
Example 3.8 Observe that
This example shows that the intuitionistic implication does not collapse into the classical implication. Therefore, the graph-theoretic fibring of interpretation structures retains the intuitionistic character of the component. ∇
Thus, the example above shows that the fibring of classical propositional logic with intuitionistic propositional logic does not collapse into classical logic, since otherwise the interpretation structure (Σ, I c+i ) would satisfy ((¬ i (¬ i ξ))⊃ i ξ) showing that intuitionistic connectives behave like classical connectives.
Fibring deductive systems
Consider again the fibring of classical and intuitionistic logics. In Figure 9 we present what should be a derivation of
From an intuitive point of view a derivation in the deductive system resulting from the fibring should result from the interleaving of rules and axioms from both deductive systems. Figure 9 : Derivation in the fibring of classical and intuitionistic logics
In order to define derivations we now introduce the notion of deductive system, again as an m-graph but now with formulas as nodes and inference rules as m-edges. Axioms are seen as inference rules as we shall see below.
Putting deductive systems together
According to what we said before we start by enriching a signature with symbols to represent both axioms and inference rules. A meta-signature is a tuple Φ = (Σ, , R)
is a m-graph extending G and
and is a set { s : s → π} s∈V + . Each R n is a symbol for representing inference rules with n premises. The edge s is called s-verum and is important to represent, in our setting, axioms. An axiom is the target of a unary rule whose antecedent is a verum schema formula. We denote by G the m-graph obtained by enriching G with the m-edges s : s → π.
A morphism between meta-signatures h from
to G 1 is a signature morphism from Σ 1 to Σ 2 , h e ( s ) = h v (s) and h e ((R 1 ) n ) = (R 2 ) n for each n > 0. As seen for interpretation structures we assume that, for fibring, the signatures have the same set V of sorts. In this case a meta-signature morphism h is equivalent to a signature morphism, and in this situation we may confuse h with h G 1 and with h G 1 .
Our objective now is to say what is a deductive system based on a m-graph. According to the intuition, the nodes are language expressions and there are two kinds of m-edges to consider. One kind is for inference rules and axioms as illustrated in Figure 10 and in Figure 11 , respectively. As it is well known Modus Ponens (MP) is a binary inference rule. The intuition for the graph description of MP is based on the fact that MP is applied to an implication formula and its antecedent (the first argument of the implication), and allows to conclude the consequent of the implication (its second argument). Thus, MP is an m-edge whose source is a sequence of two morphisms, one for the implication and the other for the first projection. The target of MP is the second projection. In the same vein, an axiom is an medge whose source is an appropriate special morphism s and the target is the morphism corresponding to the axiom formula. That is, an axiom is seen as a special case of unary rule (see Figure 11) . The second kind of m-edges in a deductive system corresponds to the constructors that make formula morphisms to commute, see Figure 12 .
A deductive system over over a meta-signature Φ is a pair (G , β) where G is such that
• V is the set of all expressions over G (that is, the morphisms of G + ); Figure 12 : M-edges for a constructor in the deductive system for the fibring of classical and intuitionistic logics.
•
and β is a signature morphism from G to G Φ such that
• β e (e : (ϕ 1 :
is in E and ϕ = e • ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ;
• β e (f ) ∈ R otherwise.
The first clause on E imposes the inclusion of the constructor morphisms that when composed with the source expression coincides with the target expression, as exemplified in Figure 12 . As stated in the last clause of β e all the other m-edges correspond to inference rules. The m-edges corresponding to inference rules must have as premises and conclusion, expressions with the same source, and with target π. The same source condition is imposed by the second clause of the definition of E and is crucial for instantiating a rule in a derivation.
A deductive system D is a triple
such that Φ is a meta-signature and (G , β) is a deductive system over Φ.
Example 4.1
The deductive system D c = (Φ Π , G , β) for classical propositional logic is as follows:
• Φ Π is the meta-signature (Σ Π , , R) where Σ Π is the propositional signature (G, π, ♦) introduced in Example 2.1;
• G has, besides the mandatory m-edges for connectives, the following ones for rules:
where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 , see Figure 11 ;
and ξ is p πππ 3 ;
where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 ; -m-edge MP : p ππ 1 ⊃ → p ππ 2 , see Figure 10 ;
-β e (ax k ) = R 1 for k = 1, 2, 3;
-β e (MP) = R 2 .
In the sequel, we can denote the target of ax by A. The target of ax i is the usual axiom of an Hilbert calculus for classical propositional logic but written with the schema variables ξ, ξ and ξ , so that they can be instantiated with formulas in the fibred language when applied in a derivation. ∇ Example 4.2 The deductive system D i = (Φ Π , G , β) for intuitionistic propositional logic is as follows:
is the intuitionistic propositional signature (G, π, ♦) introduced in Example 2.2;
• G has, besides the mandatory m-edges for connectives, the following ones:
and ξ is p πππ 3 ; -m-edge ax 3 : ππ → (ξ ⊃ (ξ ⊃ (ξ ∧ ξ )) where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 ; -m-edge ax 4 : ππ → ((ξ ∧ ξ ) ⊃ ξ) where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 ; -m-edge ax 5 : ππ → ((ξ ∧ ξ ) ⊃ ξ ) where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 ; -m-edge ax 6 : ππ → (ξ ⊃ (ξ ∨ ξ )) where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 ; -m-edge ax 7 : ππ → (ξ ⊃ (ξ ∨ ξ )) where ξ is p ππ 1 and ξ is p ππ 2 ; -m-edge ax 8 
-β e (ax k ) = R 1 for k = 1, . . . , 10;
-β e (MP) = R 2 . ∇
The fibring of deductive systems D 1 = (Φ 1 , G 1 , β 1 ) and D 2 = (Φ 2 , G 2 , β 2 ) with the same set V of sorts, the same and the same R is the deductive system
such that
• Σ = (G, π, ♦) is the coproduct Σ 1 Σ 2 in Sig V of Σ 1 and Σ 2 with injections i 1 and i 2 );
-V is the class of morphism of G + whose target is in V ;
whenever e : v 1 . . . v n → v 0 is in E and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n are in G + ; * the disjoint union of (β 1 e ) −1 (R) and (β 2 e ) −1 (R)
whenever r is the image of r k ∈ (β k e ) −1 (R) in the disjoint union, for k = 1, 2;
is in E and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n are in G + ;
• β e (r) = R n if r is the image of r k ∈ (β k e ) −1 (R n ) in the disjoint union, for some k = 1, 2. • β : G → G Φ is such that:
-β e (ax kc ) = R 1 for k = 1, 2, 3;
-β e (ax ki ) = R 1 for k = 1, . . . , 8;
-β e (MP c ) = β e (MP i ) = R 2 .
A graphical representation of part of this deductive system can be seen in Figure 13 . It is clear that the fibring of two deductive systems is related with the components via a morphim.
A deductive system morphism from the deductive system (Φ 1 , G 1 , β 1 ) to the deductive system (Φ 2 , G 2 , β 2 ) is a pair (h, g) where h is a meta-signature morphism from Φ 1 to Φ 2 and g is a m-graph morphism from G 1 to G 2 such that:
• h e • β e 1 = β e 2 • g e .
We will prove later on, on Proposition 4.5, that there are deductive system morphisms (i 1 , j 1 ) :
relating the deductive systems to the deductive system resulting from their fibring.
Universal constructions
We denote by MSig V the category of meta-signatures with the same set V os sorts and their morphisms. We now show that meta-signatures with the same set of sorts can be composed.
Proposition 4.4 Category MSig V has binary coproducts.
Proof: Let (Σ 1 , 1 , R 1 ) and (Σ 2 , 2 , R 2 ) be meta-signatures denoted by Φ 1 and Φ 2 respectively, with the same set V of sorts. Their coproduct is the triple
where (Σ 1 Σ 2 , i 1G 1 , i 2G 2 ) is a coproduct in Sig V of Σ 1 and Σ 2 . It is straightforward to check that the triple is indeed a coproduct. QED
We say that a formula ϕ of G + is in G + whenever there is a path over G † such that the corresponding formula is equal to ϕ. We may denote a schema formula of G + not in G + as a verum schema formula. Given morphisms ϕ 1 : s → s 1 and ϕ 2 : s 1 → s 2 of G + in G + , it is straightforward to see that ϕ 2 • ϕ 1 is also in G + . Moreover given the morphism s : s → π of G + it is straightforward to see that for any ϕ : s → s 1 in G + the morphism s • ϕ is also not in G + . Let Ded be the category of deductive systems and their morphisms and Ded V the full subcategory of Ded composed by all deductive systems with the same set V of sorts. Proof: The coproduct of deductive systems
• ((Σ, , R), i 1 , i 2 ) is a coproduct in MSig V of Φ 1 and Φ 2 ;
• j k e (e) = i k e (e) if e is in E k , for k = 1, 2;
• (j k e ) restricted to (β k e ) −1 (R) is an injection to the coproduct in Set of (β 1 e ) −1 (R) and (β 2 e ) −1 (R), for k = 1, 2.
It is straightforward to show that (i 1 , j 1 ) and (i 2 , j 2 ) are deductive system morphisms.
Let D 3 be a deductive system in Ded V and (h 1 , g 1 ) :
D 2 → D 3 deductive system morphisms. Consider the pair (h, g) such that:
• g v ( w) = (h e ) + ( w) for each vertex w of V ;
• g e (i 1 e (e 1 )) = g 1 e (e 1 ) and g e (i 2 e (e 2 )) = g 2 e (e 2 );
(1) h is a meta-signature morphism from Φ to Φ 3 by definition.
(2) g is a m-graph morphism from G to G 3 since:
(c) h e • β e = β e 3 • g e . There are two cases to consider: (i) h e (β e (i 1 e (e 1 ))) = h e (i 1 e (e 1 )) and β e 3 (g e (i 1 e (e 1 ))) = β e 3 (g 1 e (e 1 )) = h 1 e (β e 1 (e 1 )) = h 1 e (e 1 ) and so the result follows by definition of h. Similarly for e 2 in E 2 . (ii) Let r 1 ∈ (β 1 e ) −1 (R 1n ). Then h e (β e (j 1 e (r 1 ))) = h e (R n ) = (R 3 ) n and β e 3 (g e (j 1 e (r 1 ))) = β e 3 (g 1 e (r 1 )) = h e 1 (β e 1 (r g 1 ) . Commutativity for the first argument holds by definition. On the other hand,
. Moreover, (i) given e 1 in E 1 , g e (j e 1 (e 1 )) = g e (i e 1 (e 1 )) = g e 1 (e 1 ); and (ii) given
Similar to case (3).
(5) Uniqueness of (h, g). Let (h , g ) be a deductive system morphism from
by definition of deductive system morphism. Let e 1 be in E 1 . Then g e (j e 1 (e 1 )) = g e 1 (e 1 ) = g e (i 1 e (e 1 )) = g e (j 1 e (e 1 )). Let f 1 ∈ (β 1 e ) −1 (R 1 ). Then g e (j 1 e (f 1 )) = g 1 e (f 1 ) = g e (j 1 e (f 1 )). QED As we did for signatures and interpretation structures, we only consider the coproduct of deductive systems over signatures with the same set of sorts. So, in order to define the unconstrained fibring of deductive systems over signatures with different sets of sorts, we have to enrich each deductive system with the sorts of the other system. For that we define a Set ♦ indexed map · (V 1 ,π 1 ,♦ 1 ) on deductive systems as follows:
) with:
-G = (V , E 2 , src , trg ) is such that * V is the class of morphisms of G + whose target is in V ; * src : E 2 → V + , trg : E 2 → V coincide with src 2 and trg 2 , respectively;
The fibring Fib Ded of deductive systems is a map from |Ded| 2 to |Ded| such that:
Interleaving of derivations
Revisiting the motivating example of this section, assume that we want to show that ¬ i ¬ i q c follows from
This means that we have to provide a derivation whose conclusion is ¬ i ¬ i q c and whose hypotheses are elements of the set
Herein a derivation is described by two sequences separated by a semi-colon. A sequence of steps where each step corresponds to the application of either one inference rule or several rules (putted together by the operator ⊗) to different formulas, and the sequence of the formulas used but not generated in the derivation. For instance, the derivation depicted in Figure 9 is described by:
and consists of two steps, MP c and (MP i ⊗ id idπ ), applied to the sequence of formulas
Observe that when a formula is not used by an inference rule in a step the id idπ morphism is used instead. The formulas used but not generated in a derivation can be either hypotheses or axioms. For instance,
is a derivation in D c+i , depicted in Figure 14 , for q c ⊃ c q i from {q i }. Recall that axioms are seen as unary inference rules having as source a verum morphism, that is, a morphism involving the morphism. Figure 14 : Derivation of q c ⊃ c q i from {q i }.
For more details on the notion of derivation in a graph-theoretic account of logics the reader can consult [20] (namely for notions like instantiation of rules, instantiation of derivation steps, derivation as a morphism, and the categorical context in which derivations are set up).
Given a set Γ of formulas and a sequence of formulas ϕ, we say that ϕ is derived from Γ in the deductive system D, written
whenever there is a derivation l 1 , . . . , l n ; ψ of ϕ such that the formulas in ψ that are not premises of axioms are in Γ. For instance, from the examples above we can conclude that
Fibring of logic systems
A logic system has three components: the signature, the interpretation system and the deduction system. All of them are defined in terms of m-graphs. The language and derivation are described in the induced categories. A logic system is a triple L = (Σ, I, D) such that I = (Σ, I) is an interpretation system and D = (Φ, G , β) is a deductive system; where Φ is a meta-signature over Σ. Given an interpretation system I = (Σ, I) and a set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of schema formulas over Σ, we say that Γ entails ϕ in I, written as
whenever I Γ implies I ϕ for every I in I. Similarly, entailment over sequences of schema formulas can be defined. The logic system L is said to be sound if Γ I ϕ whenever Γ D ϕ for a set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of formulas and is said to be strong complete if the converse holds. The logic system L is said to be weak complete if
Observe that a strong complete logic system is also weak complete but not the other way around in general. Finally, an interpretation structure I in I is said to be sound for a rule r in D if I, ρ CONC(r) whenever I, ρ proper(ANT(r)) for every assignment ρ over I, where the map proper(·) when applied to a sequence ϕ of schema formulas in G + returns the subsequence of schema formulas that are in G + . When I is sound for all the rules in D we say that I is sound for D. These schema formulas are called proper. The logic system L is said to be sound for a deductive rule r in D, if all its interpretation structures over its signature are sound for r. • D i is the intuitionistic deductive system for introduced in Example 4.2 is a logic system, denoted by L i , for intuitionistic propositional logic. Note that the interpretation structure I i for intuitionistic logic introduced in Example 3.2 is sound for D i as it is straightforward to show. So I i is in I i . ∇
We denote by Log the class of all logic systems. The fibring Fib of logic systems is a map from Log 2 to Log such that:
• I is composed by the interpretation structures I over Σ such that the pair (Σ, I) = Fib Int ((Σ 1 , I 1 ), (Σ 2 , I 2 )) for each I 1 ∈ I 1 and I 2 ∈ I 2 ;
We now explain why there is no collapse, semantically, in the logic system resulting from the graph-theoretic fibring of the logic systems for classical and intuitionistic logics presented above.
Example 5.3
The fibring of the logic system L c , described in Example 5.1 and the logic system L i , described in Example 5.2, is the logic system L c+i = (Σ c+i , I c+i , D c+i ) where
• I c+i is composed by the interpretation structures I over Σ c+i such that
Π , I 2 )) for each I 1 ∈ I c and I 2 ∈ I i ;
and so the interpretation structure described in Example 8 resulting from the fibring of interpretation structures for classical and intuitionistic logic is also in I c+i . Hence, taking into account Example 3.8,
Soundness preservation
We start by investigating a property of the interpretation structure morphism that is important in the proof of the preservation of soundness. In particular, the injection morphisms from the components to the fibring enjoy this property. An interpretation structure morphism (h, τ ) : (Σ 1 , I 1 ) → (Σ 2 , I 2 ) is said to be non-creative whenever for each e 1 in E 1 and e 2 : s 2 → t 2 in E 2h(e 1 ) there is e 1 in E 1e 1 such that τ e s 2 t 2 (e 1 ) = e 2 . Moreover, given an interpretation structure morphism (h, τ ) : (Σ 1 , I 1 ) → (Σ 2 , I 2 ) and an assignment ρ 2 over I 2 , we denote by
). The next result relates denotations in different interpretation structures related by a non-creative interpretation structure morphism.
Lemma 6.1 Given a non-creative interpretation structure morphism (h, τ ) : I 2 ), a morphism w 1 of G 1 + , and an assignment ρ 2 over I 2 ,
on the complexity of w 1 :
which, by induction hypothesis, is equal to
The relationship established for denotations can be extended to satisfaction in a similar way. Proposition 6.2 Given a non-creative interpretation structure morphism (h, τ ) :
+ , and an assignment ρ 2 over I 2 ,
Proof:
The next result states the converse of the previous proposition under different conditions. Proposition 6.3 Given a interpretation structure morphism (h, τ ) :
⊆ D 1 by Lemma 6.1, and so
Recall from [20] the result stating that: A logic system is sound if it is sound for its deductive rules. Theorem 6.4 Soundness is preserved by the fibring of logic systems sound for its rules.
Proof: Let L 1 and L 2 be logic systems sound for the rules. Note that the rules of Fib Ded (D 1 , D 2 ) are the image by the respective signature morphisms of the rules in D 1 and in D 2 , respectively. We show that Fib(L 1 , L 2 ) is sound for its inference rules. Let (Σ, I) = (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (V 2 ,π 2 ,♦ 2 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ) (V 1 ,π 1 ,♦ 1 ) be an interpretation structure in the fibring and ρ an assignment over I. Let r 1 be a rule in D 1 . Assume that I, ρ i 1 + (proper(ANT(r 1 ))). Then, by Proposition 6.3,
proper(ANT(r 1 )) by Proposition 3.7 and so, since L 1 is sound for its rules, I 1 , ρ (i 1 ,τ 1 ) CONC(r 1 ). Again by Proposition 3.7, I 1 (V 2 ,π 2 ,♦ 2 ) , ρ (i 1 ,τ 1 ) CONC(r 1 ). Finally, by Proposition 6.2, I, ρ i 1 + (CONC(r 1 )) since the morphism from (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (V 2 ,π 2 ,♦ 2 ) to (Σ, I) is non-creative. The proof for a rule in D 2 follows a similar reasoning so we omit it. QED Basically, Theorem 6.4 says that soundness is in almost all cases preserved by fibring, since normally a logic system does not contain interpretation structures that are not sound for its rules. Soundness is useful for establishing the noncollapse of intuitionistic into classic connectives, deductively, in L c+i . Recall that in Example 5.3 we already concluded that there is not, semantically, such a collapse in L c+i .
Example 6.5 The logic system L c+i presented in Example 5.3 resulting from the fibring of the logic system L c for classical propositional logic and of the logic system L i for intuitionistic propositional logic is sound. So,
Taking into account Theorem 6.4, it is straightforward to see that the fibring of the logic systems composed by the deductive systems described in [20] and with all the interpretation structures sound for the rules, is sound (the case of the relevance logic has to be worked further due to the different notion of derivation). Moreover, it is also straightforward to see that there is also no collapse of the entailment and of the consequence relations of one system into another.
Completeness preservation
The goal of this section is to investigate preservation of completeness. Preservation of completeness means that the logic system resulting from the fibring is complete whenever the component logic systems are complete. Usually completeness is not preserved unless we impose more properties on the components of the logic systems at hand. That is, in most cases, it is not possible to prove completeness preservation for all possible complete component logic systems. We start by defining the canonical interpretation structure induced by a deductive system.
Canonical structure
Let D 1 and D 2 be deductive systems with the same set of sorts, and Γ a set of formulas in G + where
(D 1 ) generated by D 1 over D 2 and Γ, is such that: (G 1 , α 1 , D 1 , 1 ) ) where 1 is such that * V 1 are the morphisms of G + whose target is an element of V ; * E 1 ( w 1 . . . w n , w) is composed by all the m-edges e in E 1 such that w = e • w 1 , . . . , w n is in G + ;
-α v 1 (e : s → v) = v and α e 1 (c) = c;
In the sequel we will write
(D 1 ), and will assume that G means the m-graph G 1 G 2 (the disjoint union of the two m-graphs). We now show that the S D 2 (D 1 ) is sound for the deductive rules in D 1 .
Lemma 7.1 Given deductive systems D 1 and D 2 with the same set of sorts, a set Γ of formulas in G + , a path w : s → t over G † , and an assignment ρ over
Proof: The proof follows by induction on the complexity of w:
The importance of the canonical structure is that in the context of this structure it is possible to relate satisfaction with derivation. 
We now state a useful lemma that when the proper premises of a rule are derivable, then the conclusion of the rule is also derivable. We omit its proof since it constitutes a particular case of Lemma 6.6 in [20] . 
In the following two propositions we show that S Γ 
Weak completeness
We start by investigating preservation of weak completeness (that is, no hypotheses are present). With this purpose in mind, we need to better understand the denotation of a formula in the fibring of two canonical structures.
Lemma 7.5 Given deductive systems D 1 and D 2 sharing the same set of sorts V , a set Γ of formulas in G + and a concrete path w over G † , ( w, w) ∈
-w is p
Note that w 1 is not ♦ , since otherwise s 1 is ♦, which is not possible since the source of a projection has length at least 2. Hence, the path w 1 ends in a tuple as it is straightforward to see. So, assume that w 1 is w 11 , . . . , w 1n w 0 . Then ( w, w) = ( p
(D 2 ) and so the thesis follows by induction hypothesis;
The thesis follows since trg (E e (( w 1 , w 1 
by induction hypothesis, and ( w, w) = ( e • w 1 , e • w 1 ) ∈ trg (E e (( w 1 , w 1 ), −) ). QED Recall from [20] , the notion of representative which plays an important role in the proof of completeness for a single logic system. A logic system contains a representative of the canonical structure over a set Γ when it contains an interpretation structure I Γ such that
for every formula ϕ and set of formulas Γ in G + . The next result shows that
is a representative of the canonical structure for the fibring of deductive systems D 1 and D 2 . Proposition 7.6 Given deductive systems D 1 and D 2 sharing the same set of sorts and a formula ϕ of formulas in L(Σ 1 Σ 2 ), then
On the other hand, by
. Therefore ϕ is distinguished in both
of [20] . QED
In order to show preservation of weak completeness, we use the following result proved in Theorem 6.9 of [20] : A logic system is weakly complete if it contains a representative of the canonical structure over the empty set.
Theorem 7.7 Weak completeness is preserved by fibring of logic systems, each containing the canonical structure over the other and the empty set.
is a representative of the canonical structure generated by D 1 D 2 and ∅. So the fibring has a representative of that deductive system for the empty set. Hence, invoking Theorem 6.9 of [20] , we can conclude that L 1 L 2 is weakly complete. QED
We omit the proof of the next result since it follows straightforwardly by Theorem 7.7 and Proposition 7.4. Corollary 7.8 Weak completeness is preserved by fibring logic systems containing all the interpretation structures that are sound with respect to the rules. Corollary 7.8 basically says that in almost all cases the logic system resulting from the fibring is at least weak complete. Similarly to Theorem 6.4, this happens since a logic system, normally, does not contain interpretation structures that are not sound for its rules.
Example 7.9 Weak completeness for the logic system resulting from the fibring of the logic systems for classical and intuitionistic propositional logics. The logic system L c+i presented in Example 5.3, resulting from the fibring of the logic system L c for classical propositional logic and of the logic system L i for intuitionistic propositional logic, is weak complete. ∇ Taking into account Corollary 7.8, it is straightforward to see that the fibring of the logic systems composed by the deductive systems described in [20] and with all the interpretation structures sound for the rules, is weak complete (the case of the relevance logic has to be worked further due to the different notion of derivation). So, for instance, the fibring of the logic systems for paraconsistent and modal logic T is weak complete as well as the fibring of the logic systems for paraconsistent and intuitionistic propositional logics, as well as the fibring of the logic systems for equational and paraconsistent propositional logics.
Strong completeness
Preservation of strong completeness is a harder task in finding sufficient conditions for the component logics. A key concept is the notion of a truth consistent interpretation structure.
Given an interpretation structure I = G , β, over a signature Σ, a set S ⊆ V π is truth consistent whenever S ⊆ D or S ∩ D = ∅. The interpretation structure I is truth consistent if for every e : v 1 . . . v n → π in E and S i contained in V v i such that S i is truth consistent when v i is π, for i = 1, . . . , n, then trg (E e (S 1 . . . S n , −)) is truth consistent. The following notion is the deductive counterpart of the truth consistency presented above. It resembles congruence as was adopted in previous works like [23] . But is that work the component logic systems had to share implication which is not the case herein.
A deductive system D is said to be componentwise congruent for Γ whenever
The following result relates componentwise congruence with truth consistency over the canonical structures. Proof: Assume that D 1 D 2 is componentwise congruent. Let e : v 1 . . . v n → π in E and S i contained in V v i such that S i is truth consistent when v i is π, for i = 1, . . . , n. Let ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ trg (E e (S 1 . . . S n , −)). Assume that ϕ 1 is a distinguished value. Let ϕ i1 , . . . , ϕ in be such that 
(D 2 ), respectively. Assume, with no loss of generality, that e ∈ E 1 . So ϕ 1 = e • (ϕ 11 . . . ϕ 1n ) and ψ 1 = e • (ψ 11 . . . ψ 1n ) where (ϕ 1i , δ 2i ) ∈ S i for some δ 2i and (ψ 1i , θ 2i ) ∈ S i for some δ 1i and θ 2i , i = 1, . . . , n. Since S i is truth consistent then either (ϕ 1i , δ 2i ) and (ψ 1i , θ 2i ) are distinguished values in S Γ (D 2 ) is a representative of the canonical structure for the fibring of deductive systems D 1 and D 2 , providing that the fibring of deductive systems is componentwise congruent. Proposition 7.13 Given deductive systems D 1 and D 2 sharing the same set of sorts, and a set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of formulas in G + , then
assuming that D 1 D 2 is componentwise congruent for Γ.
The proof of this implication mimics the proof of Proposition 7.6 so we omit it. QED We now introduce the well known notion of a maximal set of formulas. A logic system L has maximals if for each consistent set Γ of formulas and formula ϕ such that Γ D ϕ, there is a consistent set Γ extending Γ such that Γ D ϕ and Γ ∪ {ψ} D ϕ for every ψ / ∈ Γ. We call Γ a maximal set for Γ and ϕ.
Theorem 7.14 A logic system with maximals containing a representative of the canonical structure over a maximal set for each set of formulas and formula is strong complete.
Proof: Let Γ be a set of formulas and ϕ a formula. Assume that Γ D ϕ.
Then there is a maximal set Γ for Γ and ϕ. Let I Γ ∈ I be an interpretation structure representing S Γ (D). Then, S Γ (D) Γ and S Γ (D) ϕ and so I Γ ϕ and I Γ Γ. Therefore, Γ I ϕ since I Γ ϕ and I Γ Γ and I Γ ∈ I. QED
We are now ready to provide a sufficient condition for the preservation of strong completeness by fibring.
Theorem 7.15 Strong completeness is preserved by fibring of logic systems such that:
• the fibring has maximals, for each set of formulas Γ and formula, enjoying componentwise congruence for Γ;
• each component contains the canonical structure over the other and those maximal sets. . Finally, by Theorem 7.14, we can conclude that the fibring is complete. QED
The conditions in Theorem 7.15 are not so general as the ones we obtained for the preservation of soundness and weak completeness. Therefore, less logic systems can be fibred with preservation of strong completeness. Nevertheless, preservation of strong completeness holds, among others, in the fibring of modal logics at least as stronger as T .
The preservation of soundness and completeness ensures that the graphtheoretic semantics developed herein is adequate with respect to the envisaged deductive system. Moreover, it provides a criterion for checking in a semantic way that other combination approaches are sound and complete with respect to the widely recognized deductive system for fibring. For instance, the combination approaches described in [22, 3] . We can further outline this idea. Consider two logics each one characterized by a class of models M and M , respectively. Let (Σ , I , D ) and (Σ , I , D ) be graph-theoretic logic systems for the same logics whose graph-theoretic fibring is sound and complete. Assume that m m is the model resulting from combining m ∈ M and m ∈ M .
One can ask whether the combined logic characterized by the class of models M = {m m : m ∈ M , m ∈ M } is sound and complete with respect to the deductive system for fibring. The results in this paper help to provide an answer to this question when the following conditions are satisfied:
• for every m ∈ M there are I ∈ I and I ∈ I such that I I satisfies the same formulas as m;
• for every I ∈ I and I ∈ I there is m ∈ M such that m satisfies the same formulas as I I .
The first condition guarantees that the combination is sound with respect to the deductive system for fibring. For instance, assume that D ϕ. Let m ∈ M be an arbitrary model. Then, by the first condition, there are I ∈ I and I ∈ I such that I I satisfies the same formulas as m. By soundness of the graph-theoretic approach we conclude that I I ϕ and so m satisfies ϕ as desired.
The second condition guarantees that the combination is complete with respect to the deductive system for fibring. For instance, assume that ϕ is valid in M . It is enough to show that ϕ is valid in the graph-theoretic semantics resulting from fibring. Let I ∈ I and I ∈ I . Then, by the second condition, there is m ∈ M such that m and I I satisfies the same formulas. So, I I satisfies ϕ as wanted.
Concluding remarks
In the sequel of [20] , we developed a graph-theoretic account of fibring of logic systems. The approach is general enough to cover fibring of a large class of logics, encompassing logics with a non-deterministic semantics as well as substructural logics like relevance logic. Preservation of soundness and weak completeness were proved under very general assumptions. Preservation of strong completeness by fibring requires a tighter context. To the best of our knowledge, results on weak completeness were not proved before in previous work on fibring.
It is also worthwhile to point out that the graph-theoretic setting provides the means to avoid some well known collapses [7] in a very natural way, different from previous works on the topic [21, 3] . For instance, in the case of the modulated fibring, the collapse was avoided by restricting instantiation in derivation which is not the case in the graph-theoretic approach.
Several extensions of this work are worthwhile to pursue. The first step is to analyze preservation results about cut elimination, interpolation, quantifier elimination and decidability, among others. We hope to capitalize on the results obtained in [5, 10, 17] for interpolation and general characterizations of logics with cut elimination [18] . We also believe that the graph-theoretic approach should be explored in the field of fusion of modal logics, namely to cope with modal logics endowed with general semantics and having different valuation sets. We also intend to investigate a graph-theoretic account of combination of theories with the aim of obtaining preservation of interpolation and decidability. Some results on combining theories can be seen in [2, 13] .
